This paper proves that the standard quasi-geometric discounting model used in dynamic consumer theory and political economics does not possess Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) with continuous decision rules, if there is a strictly positive lower bound on wealth. It is shown that these discontinuities imply that the decision-maker strictly prefers lotteries over next period's assets. An extension with lotteries is presented, and the existence of an MPE with continuous decision rule is established. The models with and without lotteries are numerically compared, and some appealing properties of the lottery-enhanced model are noted.
Intertemporal preferences with quasi-geometric (or quasi-hyperbolic) discounting have been proposed for studying optimal national savings policy with imperfect altruism (Phelps and Pollak (1968) ), for studying the savings behavior of individuals who value commitment to a consumption plan (Laibson (1997) ) and for studying optimal growth outside of the straitjacket of geometric discounting (Barro (1999) ). In addition, quasi-geometric discounting may arise endogenously in models of collective decision-making. Examples include models of political turnover and disagreement (Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989) ), models of majority-based legislative decision-making (Battagliani and Coate (2008)), and nonunitary models of household decision-making (Hertzberg (2012)). 1
Decision problems with quasi-geometric discounting must be analyzed as a dynamic game because of the implied time inconsistency of intertemporal preferences (Strotz (1956) ). This paper is motivated, in part, by a puzzle regarding the computation of Markovian equilibria of this game. Consider a decision-maker (henceforth DM) with an infinite planning horizon, constant endowment, and facing a constant gross interest rate equal to the inverse of the (long-run) discount factor between any two future consecutive periods, β. The (short-run) discount factor between the current period and the next is δβ (δ < 1). In this situation, the "present bias" introduced by δ should cause DMs to persistently dissave. Indeed, for models in which a closed-form Markovian solution can be found, the solution displays continuous (and smooth) dissaving behavior. However, when the equilibrium of the same model is computed on a grid using value (and policy) function iteration, the decision rule found has multiple points of discontinuity, and these points are typically stationary points as well (i.e., steady states with no dissaving). This is true even when the analytical solution is fed in as the initial guess.
The first contribution of this paper is to show that any Markovian decision rule of this stationary environment with CRRA preferences must be discontinuous, if the DM's net wealth model exist under general conditions. 5 Third, Markovian decision rules can be computed with relative ease because the decision rule for mean asset choice can be computed directly (without having to keep track of the lotteries underlying these choices).
The final contribution is a numerical comparison of the lottery-enhanced model with the model without lotteries. Three findings emerge from this comparison. First, for the model for which a closed-form decision rule is known, the lottery-enhanced model solution closely tracks the closed-form solution for asset levels that are far from the debt limit. In contrast, the solution of the standard model on the same grid features a discontinuous decision rule with very different choices. Thus, the lottery-enhanced model can be a good approximation of the model without a positive lower bound on wealth for a (large) range of asset levels.
Second, i.i.d. shocks to endowments can serve to almost concavify the continuation value function, provided the shocks are volatile enough and/or the present bias is small. In such situations, the decision rule from the model without lotteries is seemingly continuous and identical to the decision rule from the lottery-enhanced model (lotteries are effectively superfluous if the continuation value function is almost concave). This finding is in line with Harris and Laibson's (2001) limit result that when endowments are drawn each period from a distribution with continuous density, the Markovian decision rule is continuous in current wealth, provided δ is sufficiently close to 1.
Third, the two models give different answers to an important policy question: Is there an ideal debt limit from the perspective of a current DM with no inherited debt? The answer from the lottery-enhanced model is intuitive: Because of the present bias, there is an ideal debt limit that allows the current DM to indulge its preference for current consumption (and to which it goes immediately). In contrast, there are many debt limits that deliver roughly the same utility to the current DM in the standard model. These debt limits share the property that the location of the first stationary point (where DMs will eventually settle) is roughly the same for all of them (the lottery-enhanced model has a unique stationary point at the debt limit).
The paper is organized into three parts. The first part, Section 2, presents and analyzes the standard stationary quasi-geometric discounted model with a positive lower bound on wealth. The second part, Section 3, gives the extension to lotteries. The third part, Sections 4-6, presents the numerical comparisons of the model with and without lotteries. The proofs of all lemmas and theorems appear in Appendix A.
The Standard Quasi-Geometric Discounting Model
We study a canonical discrete-time, infinite-horizon, intertemporal choice problem with quasigeometric discounting. 6 The DM has a constant stream of endowment y and a time-additive utility function with a per-period utility function U (c) = c 1−γ /(1 − γ), γ > 0 and c ≥ 0. The (long-run) discount factor between any two future consecutive periods is β < 1, while the discount factor between the current and next period is δβ, δ < 1. The DM has access to a financial market, in which it can save or borrow subject to a debt limit b < 0. The price of a unit bond or deposit is β. Importantly, y + (1 − β)b = κ > 0, which implies that the DM can sustain a strictly positive level of consumption at the debt limit. We follow convention (Laibson (1997) and Krusell and Smith (2003) ) and focus on pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE), i.e., equilibria in which the current choice of assets is a function of inherited assets. 7
Let W (b) be the continuation value to a DM starting next period with assets b. Then, the current DM's decision problem is:
6 Under some conditions, the problem is isomorphic to a model of government expenditure choice in which two parties with different per-period utility functions switch power with equal probability. This equivalence is shown in Appendix B.
7 See Maskin and Tirole (2001) for a general definition of MPE.
Given that the interest rate is equal to the long-run discount rate, the decision rule that The present bias due to δ < 1 implies that there cannot be any savings in any MPE. If a(b) > b for any b, the DM could get strictly higher utility by choosing b this period, and let the next period's DM do the saving (i.e., let next period's DM choose a(b) > b). Although the current DM dislikes saving in the current and future periods, it dislikes it more in the current period, given δ < 1, and so would prefer to postpone the saving behavior.
Theorem 1 In any MPE, a(b) ≤ b, and a(b) is increasing in b.
An important implication is that the debt limit is a steady state of any MPE.
Corollary 1 b is a steady state of any MPE.
Since
, recalling the definition of κ gives a second useful corollary:
Corollary 2 In any MPE, c(b) ≥ κ > 0.
Discontinuity of MPE Decision Rules
The main goal of this section is to establish that any MPE decision rule a(b) will fail to be continuous on the entire domain. We begin with a result that states that there is a right neighborhood of b in which, in any MPE, it is optimal for the DM to choose b = b. Let b 1M satisfy:
Since U (c) is strictly decreasing in c and δ < 1, b 1M > b. Then, we have:
To understand why the theorem holds, consider the DM's optimal action if it could bind future DMs to follow any action it wanted and there is no debt limit. Since W (b) is maximized with a(b) = b, the DM would want future DMs to choose a(b) = b and would, therefore, choose b so that U (y + b − βb ) = δU (y + (1 − β)b ). This "full-commitment" program is not available to the DM, except when b = b 1M : In this case, the DM can indulge its present bias and choose b, and the debt limit ensures that all future DMs will set a(b) = b.
When b < b 1M , the DM would like to choose b lower than b, but the debt limit prevents that and its next best option is to choose b. Notice that the lower is δ, the wider the neighborhood is as the desire to dissave is stronger.
The next lemma further characterizes an MPE under the assumption that the decision rule is continuous. If a(b) is continuous, there must be an > 0, such that for all b ∈
For such b, the DM's optimal decision will satisfy
since the DM must expect the next period's DM to choose b (Theorem 2). Using the parametric form for U , the above FOC implies that for
Denote the r.h.s. of the above equation by h(b). Note that h(b 1M ) = b, and h(b) is strictly
The lemma verifies this conjecture.
Since h(b) is continuous, the following holds:
Thus far, a(b) has been pinned down over [b, b 2M ] under the assumption that a(b) is continuous. Notice that the function has a kink at b 1M . The slope of a(·) below b 1M is 0, and the slope above b 1M is δ 1/γ / 1 + δ 1/γ β . This kink in the decision rule implies that at ).
An implication of Theorem 3 is that W (b) will fail to be continuous as well. The reason is that, in any MPE, the fact that consumption is bounded below by κ > 0 implies that the 
Discontinuous Decision Rule and Multiple Steady States
The fact that MPE decision rules are not continuous everywhere leads to a new channel through which debt levels other than b can be sustained as a steady state.
We characterize one type of nondebt-limit steady state that might arise. To do so, it is convenient to define Ω 2 (b) : [b, ∞) → R as:
Then, Ω 2 (b) is the payoff to the DM if it chooses b ∈ [b, b 1M ] and knows that the next period's DM will choose b, and Ω 3 (b) is the payoff to the DM if it chooses b ∈ [b 1M , b 2M ] and believes that next period's DM will choose b according to the function h(b) (and, therefore, knows that the DM in the period after next will choose b). Then, our candidate for a nondebt-limit steady state is a b * such that
The left-most expression is the steady-state payoff for b * . This payoff must equal the payoff from going to the debt limit in two periods, and it must weakly dominate the payoff from going to the debt limit in three periods. Such a b * may not exist, but if it does, then:
is an MPE decision rule.
Some aspects of this theorem are noteworthy. First, the h(b) is the same function as in equation (4), but now it applies over the smaller interval
features an upward jump (discontinuity) at b * . The discontinuity is the key as to why b * can be sustained as a steady state. The DM does not indulge its preference for current consumption because it knows that if it dissaved slightly today, next period's DM will dissave substantially. Since future DMs dissave too much from the current DM's perspective, this behavior is not desirable from the current DM's perspective. Thus, the current DM weakly prefers to choose b * rather than to dissave.
Second, the theorem asserts that any MPE decision rule of the environment in which asset choices are restricted to lie in [b * , ∞) can be grafted onto the first three rows of equation (5) to constitute an MPE decision rule. This is possible because for b ≤ b * , the DM would prefer to choose b * over anything greater than b * regardless of what a(b) is for b > b * , and for b > b * , the DM would prefer to choose b * over anything less than b * regardless of what
Third, the existence of a nondebt-limit steady state opens up the possibility of other such steady states. For a DM with b > b * , b * effectively serves as a hard debt limit. Suppose, then, there exists b * * > b * that satisfies a condition analogous to (5) with b * replaced by b * * and b
replaced by b * in the definitions of b 1M , b 2M , Ω 2 , and Ω 3 . Then, b * * can be supported as a steady state without altering the status of b * as a steady state. This process can (potentially) be carried out many times and explains why the finding of multiple steady states is common in computations (note that steady-state b's need not be negative, i.e., the "debt limits" could simply be a lower bound on asset holdings).
Discontinuous Decision Rule and Benefit of Lotteries
The continuity of the payoff function V (b) (Theorem 4) implies that at any point of discontinuity of a(b), the DM is indifferent between two pairs of consumption and continuation asset levels {c(b 1 ), b 1 } and {c(b 2 ), b 2 } where b 1 = b 2 and so c(b 1 ) = c(b 2 ). Such indifference generates a demand for lotteries.
Any risk-neutral intermediary would be willing to engage in a lottery in which it offers a loan of β (λb 1 + (1 − λ) b 2 ) and, in the next period, demands b 1 with probability λ and b 2 with probability (1 − λ). For the DM, this lottery provides a certain consumption of
and the lottery strictly dominates following either of the two deterministic paths. Thus:
Then, fair-priced lotteries strictly dominate the associated pure strategies at any point where a(b) is discontinuous.
Another way to understand the value of lotteries is the following. Suppose, again, that at b, the DM is indifferent between two pairs of consumption and continuation asset levels
is available to the DM at b and, so, must be weakly dominated by
. Thus, W (·) is strictly convex between b 1 and b 2 . Lotteries allow the DM to replace convex segments of W (·) by that segment's concave upper envelope, leading to higher (expected) continuation values for a given level of current consumption.
We close this section with a comment on the difficulty of computing equilibria of the standard model. The issue is that the functions a(·) and W (·) cannot be accurately interpolated by standard techniques as both functions will have one or more points of discontinuity and the locations of these points are not known in advance. On the other hand, if the space
is approximated by a grid, there is no assurance that the equations for a(b) and W (b)
will have a solution on the grid. This computational awkwardness of the quasi-geometric model is a second motivation for developing the model with lotteries.
choices belongs to the closed interval [b,b] , where b ≥ −y/(1 − β). If b is equal to its lower bound, we require that U be well defined over c ≥ 0. Otherwise, it is sufficient that U be well defined on c > 0. In either case, we will assume that U (c) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable on the relevant domain. 
The probability measure in the definition makes it seem that an MPEL is a challenging equilibrium object to characterize and compute. However, the optimization problem can be reformulated so that φ(b , b) does not appear explicitly. To do this, consider the problem of choosing the best lottery with a given expected value B; namely,
Since W (b) ∈ W , w(B; W ) is well defined, and a lottery attaining the supremum generally exists. 8 Then, the following characterization w(B; W ) holds:
i.e., w(B; W ) is the least concave function that majorizes W (b).
The optimization problem (7) can now be restated as follows:
Then, we have the following equivalent definition of an MPEL: (8)).
This definition parallels the definition of an MPE in the standard quasi-geometric discounting model. The main differences are that w(·; W ) replaces W (b) in the optimization problem and, correspondingly, the r.h.s. of the recursion for W (b) has w(·; W ). Lotteries are implicit in these replacements but otherwise do not make an explicit appearance.
Characterization
The concavity of w(·; W ) implies well-behaved decision rules for any admissible W (b). This fact makes the lottery-enhanced model analytically and computationally facile. is Lipschitz with constant 1/β.
The analog of Theorem 1 holds here as well. However, since the bound applies to A(b),
A steady state now is a debt level b such that the DM chooses b with probability 1. Since a feasible lottery cannot put any probability mass on values of b < b, the analog of Corollary 1 holds:
Corollary 4 b is a steady state of any MPEL.
The analog of Corollary 2 also holds.
One important difference between the standard model and the model with lotteries is that, in any MPEL, W (b) is both continuous and monotone (but not generally concave).
Theorem 9 In any MPEL, W (b) is continuous and increasing in b.
Existence
Let C be the space of continuous functions defined on [b,b] 
Then F is a nonempty, bounded, closed, and convex subset of C .
Then:
Theorem 10 An MPEL exists.
Computation
The model is computed via discretization.
is the upper convex hull of these points. Several algorithms exist to compute convex hulls. The one used here is Andrew (1979) , which goes as follows:
be the points that constitute the upper convex hull, with the elements in ascending order by b. P k is built up recursively. Suppose the recursion is at the
does not make a clockwise turn relative to the line segment connecting the last two elements of P k , drop (b j , W k (b j )). If, after the drop, P k contains at least two elements, compare the segment connecting the new last element of P k to (b j+1 , W k (b j+1 )) with the line segment connecting the new last two elements of P k . If the former does not make a clockwise turn relative to the latter, drop the (new) last element of P k . Continue this way until either the line segment connecting the last element of P k to (b j+1 , W k (b j+1 )) does make a clockwise turn relative to the line segment connecting the last two elements of P k or there is only one element in P k . At this point, include (b j+1 , W k (b j +1 )) in P k and proceed to (b j+2 , W k (b j+2 )) and repeat these steps. The recursion begins with
, be the slopes between the points j and j + 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1. By construction, s 1 > s 2 > . . . > s J−1 . Then:
2. Otherwise, continue from j = 2 though J − 1 until either of the conditions below is satisfied:
3. If the above conditions are not satisfied for any j < J, then for j = J check condition (a) above and, if true, set
and ζ ∈ (0, 1) is some chosen "relaxation" parameter. From an initial W 0 , the iterations
| is generally less than as well).
Smooth and Discrete Solutions
The decision rules from three models with U (c) = ln(c) are computed and compared. In the first model, there is no strictly positive lower bound on wealth and a closed-form differentiable (smooth) solution is available. 10 In the second model, the asset space is a uniformly spaced
is being assigned a value that is "off the grid." What this means is that the DM is choosing the grid p j−1 with probability [p j −B]/[p j − p j−1 ], and the grid p j with probability [B −p j−1 ]/[p j −p j−1 ]. Recall our earlier assertion that only two-point lotteries are needed to attain w(B; W ).
10 As shown in Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) , the decision rule is
grid on [−0.25, 0.10]. The third model has the same grid as the second model, but lotteries are permitted. In all models, y = 1, δ = 0.98, R = 1.05, and β = 1/R.
The top panel of Figure 1 plots the decision rule from the standard model solved on the grid. It confirms that the decision rule is discontinuous with multiple stationary points. The bottom panel plots the closed-form solution along with the two discrete approximations (the 45-degree line is omitted to reduce clutter). For the model with lotteries, we plot A(b), the expected value of next period's assets. When b is away from the debt limit, the closed-form solution and A(b) are quite close. As b approaches the lower bound of the grid, the two decision rules diverge as A(b) goes to the debt limit (its unique stationary point). In contrast, the behavior of a discrete model without lotteries is very different: There are many absorbing values of b , corresponding to all the different nondebt-limit steady states.
A point to stress is that the closed-form solution cannot be recovered via standard finitestate value/policy function iteration. That solution requires the debt limit to be the negative of the present value of endowments. If b is set to this limit, its choice would imply zero consumption and an unboundedly low V (b). If b is set to a slightly larger number, Theorem 3 applies, and the iterations generate a discontinuous decision rule. This fact might explain why locating smooth solutions for quasi-geometric discounting models is often challenging:
If the computational method implicitly imposes a lower bound on b that can actually be chosen, a smooth solution might fail to exist.
Lotteries and Shocks
This section extends the model with lotteries to include shocks to endowments. There are two motivations for this: First, to show that uncertainty can be easily incorporated into the model with lotteries, and, second, to investigate the extent to which shocks can substitute for lotteries in generating continuous decision rules.
where R is the gross interest rate. Let F (z, y), y, z ∈ Y ⊂ R denote the CDF of next period's endowment z, given the current period's endowment y. Let W y (b) be the continuation value of a DM that starts next period with assets b, conditional on current endowment y. Then,
An MPEL is a collection {A y (b), W y (b)}, y ∈ Y , that satisfies (10)-(12). The main modification, thus, is that in the first-stage optimization problem (10) almost no difference to equilibrium decision rules and that is what we find.
Lest these findings give the impression that shocks are a good substitute for lotteries, two cautionary facts are worth noting. First, there is an important difference in the convergence properties of the two models. As mentioned earlier, when the model without lotteries is solved on a grid, there is no assurance that a (pure-strategy) solution exists. In fact, for our choices of σ y , the model failed to converge (even though it converged for the stationary case). In Figure 2 , we simply displayed the decision rule at the end of 3,000 iterations. In contrast, the model with lotteries converged (in both value and policy functions) to within a tolerance of 10 −6 in the same number of iterations, regardless of whether σ y is 0, 0.01, or 0.02. Second, the presence or absence of nonconcavities in the continuation value function (of the model without lotteries) is sensitive to seemingly small differences in δ. For instance, if σ y is held at 0.02 but δ is lowered to 0.96, jumps reappear.
Lotteries and the Ideal Debt Limit
This section compares the implications of the standard model and the model with lotteries for a substantive policy issue. Whether we are concerned with borrowing arrangements for individuals or for countries, there are many policies whose ultimate effect is to alter debt limits. The question we address in this section is: What is the ideal debt limit for the current DM, conditional on starting with no assets?
The top panel of Figure 3 plots V (0) of the current DM in the two models (β and δ are set at their previous values) as b/mean(y) varies from 0 to −2. In the top panel, y is constant at 1. For the model with lotteries, welfare initially increases with b but then declines. This accords with intuition: If δ = 1, the DM is indifferent between different b since it strictly prefers to set c = y. However, with δ < 1, the current DM would prefer to consume more in the current period and a constant amount in all future periods. This can be accomplished by a b that is exactly large enough to support the additional consumption desired in the initial period. Further increases in b lower welfare because the current DM foresees that it Welfare Across Debt Limits (δ=0.90,(1+r)=1.05, β=1/(1+r), std dev (y)=0.1)
Debt Limit as Proportion of Mean Endowment no lotteries lotteries
will end up consuming too much in the near future and too little in the far future (when the debt limit is reached). The shape of V (0) as a function of b is, thus, an inverted-U.
For the model without lotteries, the relationship between welfare and the debt limit is not as intuitive. As in the model with lotteries, welfare declines as b is increased beyond the ideal debt limit, but it then rises again. The reason for this odd behavior is that b affects the location of the first nondebt-limit stationary point (steady state) with debt, where the DM ends up in the long run. As the debt limit expands, the distance between this stationary point and the ideal debt limit fluctuates and, so, welfare fluctuates with b as well. The middle panel in Figure 3 shows that the relationship between V (0) and b features fluctuations over some range of b even when there is substantial volatility in endowments (σ y = 0.05). Although these fluctuations occur well past the ideal debt limit, its presence can be relevant if low debt limits are infeasible for some other reason. The bottom panel shows that the relationship between V (0) and b is the same for the two models if endowments are sufficiently volatile (σ y = 0.10), as the decision rules are now virtually identical.
Conclusion
This paper shows that Markovian decision rules of the canonical quasi-geometric discounting model are necessarily discontinuous if there is a strictly positive lower bound on wealth. This finding sheds light on why conventional grid-based computational methods seem to perform poorly for this model. The paper proposed a reformulation of the decision problem in terms of lotteries. The reformulation restores the continuity of Markovian decision rules and, consequently, has the dual benefits of assuring the existence of an equilibrium as well as computational ease.
A Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1 a(b) ≤ b: (by contradiction). Assume that a(b) > b. We will show that the DM can get higher utility by choosing b today when it knows that next period's choice will be a(b) > b.
If it chooses a(b) this period, it gets
If it chooses b this period, it gets
The difference in payoff between the deviation strategy (14) and the putative equilibrium strategy (13) is
We will show that this difference is strictly positive when we replace W (a(b)) by an upper bound and, therefore, it will be true for W (a(b)) as well.
From today's perspective, the maximum lifetime utility the DM can get starting with b tomorrow is
If the DM gets to choose each element of the sequence b , b , b , ..., it will choose them such that consumption will be constant. Therefore,
W (a(b)) in (15) by W (a(b)). This lower bound is given by
. (17) Next, by the definition of W (.) and strict concavity of U , we have
Replacing the first term in (17) by the r.h.s. of the above inequality, we obtain another (even weaker) lower bound on ∆:
(
Since a(b) > b and (1 − δ)β > 0, equation (18) is strictly positive. Therefore, the gain from choosing b at b when the policy calls for choosing a(b) > b is strictly positive. Hence, in any
must be less than a(b 1 ) and we are done. Suppose then that a(b 1 ) is feasible when b is a(b 2 ) ). Adding up these two inequalities and rearranging gives
Since b 1 > b 2 , strict concavity of U implies a(b 2 ) ≤ a(b 1 ).
Proof of Theorem 2
We will show that, for b ∈ (b, b 1M ], choosing b gives strictly higher utility than any other feasible choice of b . Define the equilibrium payoff from choosing b , given b, as
Next, consider the program
where we have replaced W (b) by the equivalent expression in (16). The FOC for the optimal choice of b is
For b = b, this condition holds with an equality when b = b 1M (this follows from the definition of b 1M ), and it holds with a strict inequality for when b ∈ [b, b 1M ). Then, from the strict concavity of U , it follows that
Next, by Corollary 1 we know that in any MPE a(b) = b and, therefore,
Hence,
Finally, combining (20), (21), and (22) gives
Thus, for b ∈ (b, b 1M ], choosing b gives strictly higher utility than any other feasible choice
Proof of Lemma 1
By Theorems 1 and 2, a(
To prove the rest, we will guess that when b ∈ (b 1M , b 2M ), the optimal choice of b is obtained from a maximization problem in which the DM optimally chooses b from the set [b, b 1M ]. By Theorems 1 and 2, the DM can predict that, for any b in this set, future DMs will choose b. Therefore, the guess, which we denote as h(b), solves
Since (23) 
Using the definitions of b 1M and b 2M , we may verify that, for b in the open interval (b 1M , b 2M ), the FOC is satisfied with equality. The parametric form for U then gives
Note that the postulated a(b) is consistent with the maintained assumption that a(b) is continuous in b, since lim b↓b 1M h(b) = b (the quickest way to see this is to observe that the condition that defined b 1M is the same as the FOC from which h(b) is derived). Note also
the guess is also consistent with Theorem 1.
Next, we will verify that our guess is the only solution for
over the open interval, then by the assumed continuity of a(b),
To proceed, suppose there is ab
Then we know that the DM must believe that all future asset choices must be b and, in that case, we know from (23) that h(b) is the optimal choice. Since a(b) = h(b), the supposition (i) must be false. (ii) Suppose that
Again, for such a choice, the DM must believe that all future asset choices must be b. Given these beliefs, however, h(b) is the optimal choice, so a(b) = h(b).
Since a(b) cannot be both equal to and less than b 1M , supposition (ii) must also be false. As (i) and (ii) exhaust all possible cases, we conclude 
and, so, a(a(b )) = b. We will show that the right-hand derivative of the objective function at b = b 1M is strictly positive. Note that the right-hand and left-hand derivatives of a(b) are different at b 1M , but in this program, we are only considering b choices that are at least as large as b 1M . The derivative of the objective function is
Evaluating this at b = b 1M (and recognizing that a
By the definition of b 1M ,
Substituting this into (25) gives
By the definition of b 2M ,
But observe that since δ < 1,
Therefore, equation (27) implies that the expression in (26) is strictly positive. Hence, the DM can obtain strictly higher utility with a b > b 1M .
Proof of Theorem 4
V (b) is strictly increasing in b: It follows from the fact that a DM with higher b can always replicate the choice of a DM with lower b (so, continuation value will be the same) but obtain strictly higher current consumption (U is strictly increasing in c).
V is continuous: Suppose that V (b) is not continuous atb. We know from the monotonicity of
. Consider the first case. Since c( b) ≥ κ > 0 (Corollary 2) for b ∈ (b−κ,b), y+b−βa(b) > 0 and, so, a(b) is feasible. Therefore, the DM can
Hence, the first case is not possible. Next, consider the second case.
and lim b↓ b V (b) > V ( b), there must exist some µ * such that a(b + µ * ) is feasible forb and provides more utility than the choice of a(b). This contradicts the optimality of a(b). Hence, the second case is not possible either. Therefore, V (b) is continuous for all b.
W (b) cannot be continuous for all b: Letb be a point at which a(b) is discontinuous. Select a sequence {b n } converging tob for which lim n a(b n ) = a 1 = a(b). By definition, W (b n ) = βW (a(b) ). Assume, to get a contradiction, that W (b) is continuous. Then, lim n W (b n ) = W (b) and lim n W (a(b n )) = W (a 1 ). Using these expressions for W (b n ) and W (b) and the fact that U is continuous gives
Next, by continuity of V and U and the assumed continuity of W ,
Since a 1 = a(bˆ), both (28) and (29) cannot simultaneously be true for δ < 1. Hence, W (b) cannot be continuous for all b.
The proof of Theorem 5 requires several lemmas.
Proof. Denote the optimal decision rule for Ω 3 (b) as a 3 (b) and the optimal decision rule for 
We can now give the proof of the first part of Theorem 5.
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 5:
is the value of the program (23) with b = b 2M , and Ω 3 (b 2M ) is the value of the program in
, which implies that the equality condition in (5) cannot be satisfied in this range. Consider the following problem for b ∈ (b, b 1M ] :
Then, Φ(b) = Ω 2 (b) since in both problems the optimal choice is b and at that choice the two values are the same. Next, observe that in program (30), b = b was available but not chosen. It follows from strict concavity of U that Ω
To establish the second part of Theorem 5, two additional lemmas are needed.
Lemma 5 Let Ω R 3 (b) be the value of the program that defines Ω 3 (b) but with the choice set restricted to
Proof. The key here is that a 3 (b) is constrained at its lower bound until someb > b 1M and beyond that point a 3 (b) rises at a slope less than 1. Therefore, regardless of whetherb is to the left or right of b * , the optimal choice in Ω 3 (b) for b ∈ [b 1M , b * ] is strictly less than b * .
Letb be the value of b for which a 3 (b) = b 1M and the constraint that b ≥ b 1M just ceases to bind. In this case, the FOC condition for optimality of a 3 (b) holds with an equality and
Next, we claim that the l.h.s. of (31) is strictly less than 0 atb = b 1M . From the definition of b 1M , we have that the first term on the l.h.s. of (31), after we substitute b 1M forb, is
the l.h.s. of (31) is negative forb = b 1M . Now observe that, from the concavity of U , the l.h.s. of (31) is strictly increasing inb and, hence, the expression will be 0 for someb > b 1M .
Next, note that in the region where the upper and lower constraints on b do not bind
which we can verify is strictly less than 1.
Hence, Ω 3
Lemma 6 Let Ω R 2 (b) be the value of the program that defines Ω 2 (b) but with the choice set
Proof. Observe that
From the above, we see that
We are now ready to give the proof of the second part of Theorem 5.
Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 5: If a * (b) is the decision rule of an MPE of the environment where b is restricted to be in [b * , ∞), then
is an MPE decision rule. 
First, we show that (i) dominates (ii). Lemmas 4, 5, and 6 imply Ω R
Finally, we show that (iii) dominates (iv). By an argument similar to that given in Theorem 2, we may show that, for all
For b = b * , we showed above that the DM will never choose b > b * . If the DM chooses something less than b * , the best it can do is given by Ω R 2 (b * ), which is the same as Ω 2 (b * ) by Lemma 6 (as Ω 2 (b * ) ≥ Ω 3 (b * )). And, by (5), we know that Ω 2 (b * ) = Ω b * (b * ). Therefore the DM is indifferent between choosing b * or something less.
For b ∈ (b * , ∞), we need to show that it is still optimal to choose a * (b). Since b * is a steady state of the restricted as well as the unrestricted environments (and therefore has the same continuation values in both environments) and a * is an MPE of the restricted environment, it is sufficient to show that a DM with b > b * will never choose b < b * , in which case a * (b) will continue to describe the equilibrium strategies for the unrestricted
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Letb be a point of discontinuity of a(b). Select a sequence {b n } converging tob such that lim n a(b n ) =ā = a(b). Note that since consumption is above κ for all b, we can use the same argument as in Theorem ?? to establish thatā is feasible atb. Now consider the lottery, whereā is chosen with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) and a(b) with probability ( Therefore for λ ∈ (0, 1), (a(b) ). Hence, the lottery is strictly preferable to the (pure strategy) equilibrium decision. Proof. We will first prove the w(B; W ) is concave. Consider B 1 , B 2 both elements of [b,b] .
Let φ k , k = 1, 2, be the lotteries that attain w(B k ; W ). By convexity of the constraint set, the probability measure defined by the compound lottery λφ 1 + (1 − λ)φ 2 is feasible for λB 1 + (1 − λ)B 2 , where λ ∈ (0, 1), and delivers λw(B 1 ; W ) + (1 − λ)w(B 2 ; W ). Hence
To prove the second part, we must show that if g(b) ≥ W (b) and g(b) is concave then g(B) ≥ w(B; W ). Observe that replacing W (b) with g(b) in (8) gives w(B; g) ≥ w(B, W ). Since g(b) is concave, we must have w(B, g) = g(B). Therefore, g(B) ≥ w(B; W ).
Proof of Theorem 7
Continuity: In (9), B is being chosen from a convex set and the objective function is strictly concave in B because U is strictly concave in c and w is concave in B . It follows from the Theorem of the Maximum (Stokey and Lucas (1989) Monotonicity: The proof that A(b) is increasing in b is essentially the same as the proof that a(b) is increasing in b given in Theorem 1 and is therefore not repeated here. To show that c(b) is increasing in b, we exploit the fact that w(b; W ) is concave. Concavity implies that 
For the second case, this implies b
Combining the two cases, we have 1/β ≥ |A
Proof of Theorem 8
The steps to establish that A(b) ≤ b are essentially the same as in Theorem 1. The only difference is that we need an upper bound for w (A(b); W ) instead of W (A(b) ). As stated in Theorem 1, W (b) is the maximum utility that the DM can get with only pure strategies.
Since W (b) is strictly concave in b, the maximum utility the DM can get if it chooses a lottery over b with expected value of b is also W (b). The remaining steps are then exactly the same as in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 9
The continuity of W (b) follows from the continuity of w(b; W ) (a concave function is continuous), the continuity of c(b), and the continuity of U . To prove monotonicity, let b 1 < b 2 and suppose, to get a contradiction,
A(b 2 ) and from monotonicity of A it follows that A(b 2 ) > A(b 1 ). But this implies that the DM with b 2 will be strictly better off if it chose A(b 1 ) (which is feasible for it) since that would give the DM strictly higher consumption today and strictly higher continuation utility.
This contradicts the optimality of A(b). Therefore, W (b) is increasing in b.
Proof of Lemma 3
Fix A ∈ F and define the operator T A as
We claim that (i) (T A W )(b) ∈ C , (ii) T A is a contraction map, and (iii) T A is continuous in A. Given these claims, the first part of the lemma follows from (i) and (ii) and an application of the Contraction Mapping Theorem (Stokey and Lucas (1989) U (y + b − βB ) + δβw(B ; W (b; A)).
We claim that (i) H is continuous, (ii) H(F ) ⊂ F , and (iii) the family H(F ) is equicontinuous. Recalling that F is a nonempty, bounded, closed, and convex subset of C , the existence of a solution to (34) follows from an application of the Schauder Fixed Point
Theorem (Stokey and Lucas (1989) , Theorem 17.4, page 520).
Claim (i): Let A ∈ F and let {A n } ⊂ F be a sequence such that lim n A n − A = 0.
We wish to show that lim n (HA n ) − (HA) = 0. For this, it is sufficient to show that lim n w(·; W n ) − w(·; W ) = 0, where W n ≡ W (b; A n ) and W ≡ W (b; A). Now, observe that by Lemma 3, there exists N such that for all n > N , W n − W < . Fix B ∈ [b,b] and let φ B n and φ B be the probability measures that attain w(B, W n ) and w(B, W ), respectively. Then,
Since B was arbitrary, we have sup B |w(B; W n ) − w(B; W )| = w(·; W n ) − w(·; W ) ≤ W n − W < for all n > N . Hence, lim n w(·; W n ) − w(·; W ) = 0.
Claims (ii) Governments might spend on both their own constituents and the opposing party's constituents. Let (g N , g S ) denote the spending on the two types of constituents. The utility obtained by the government of each type is u N (g N , g S ) = g 1−γ N 1 − γ + θ g 1−γ S 1 − γ and u S (g N , g S ) = θ g 1−γ
where θ ∈ [0, 1] and 0 < γ < 1. The parameter θ captures the degree of polarization in the economy: If θ = 0, then neither type of government gets any benefit from expenditure directed toward the other type's constituents; if θ = 1, then both types care equally about the expenditure directed toward the other type. The parameter γ controls how rapidly the marginal benefit of government expenditure declines with spending.
Let us suppose that region k ∈ {N, S} is in power and optimally allocates available resources between the two types. Given the utility functions, it follows that g ∼k = θ 1/γ g k .
Since nothing depends on the identity of the party in power, we need only distinguish governments by whether or not they are in power. Let g denote the per capita spending on members of the party in power. Then, the period utility of the party in power is u P (g) = ϕ P g 1−γ 1 − γ , where ϕ P = 1 + θ 1/γ , and the period utility of the party that is out of power, as a function of g, is
Since θ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 ≥ γ > 0, ϕ P ≥ ϕ O , where the equality holds only if θ = 1 or γ = 1.
We can express the decision problem of the party in power recursively as follows:
where p = 1+θ 1/γ and q is the price of the bond. Let a(b) denote the solution to this decision problem. Then, the lifetime utility of the party currently out of power is
Now observe that
Then,
and
s.t.
Aside from the normalizing factor 1/p, (35) and (36) are identical to the key equations of the quasi-geometric discounting model in the text, with δ = 0.5 (ϕ P + ϕ O ) /ϕ P ≤ 1 and q = β.
